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I. INTRODUCTION
The international community has experienced two important United
Nations' conferences in the last twenty years: the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992' and the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) from 1973 to
1982.2 These two conferences are important due to two independent but
mutually reinforcing factors: the breadth of participation3 in the conferences
and their function as international law-making fora.
The United Nations (UN) is increasingly looked to as a legitimate institu-
tion for creating a global legal order for future international cooperation.4
Conferences convened under the auspices of the UN have become and will
increasingly be the primary modality for international law-making for those
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preparation of this article. The writer would also like to thank Professors Thomas Franck, Paul
zasz, Philippe Sands and Gregory Fox for their invaluable comments on the draft version of
this article. However, I am responsible for all the views expressed in this article.
1. UNCED was the largest intergovernmental meeting ever held. UNCED Secretary-
General said: "The world will not be the same after this Conference. Diplomacy will not be the
same. The United Nations will not be the same. And prospects for our earth cannot-must
not-be the same." Earth Summit Approves Agenda 21, Rio Declaration Record Number of
World Leaders Attend, 29 UN Chronicle, Sept. 1992, at 59-60.
2. UNCLOS I was hailed as the most important multilateral conference of the 1970's.
Albert W. Koers, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea-some remarks on
its contribution towards the making of international law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS
SOURCES: LIBER AMICORUM MAARTEN Bos 23, 23 (Wydo P. Heere ed., 1989).
3. UNCED was attended by 176 State delegations and a delegation from EEC. Report of
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26(Vol. IV) (1992), at 4-6 [hereinafter Report of UNCED, Vol V]. UNCLOS El was attended by
163 State delegations. Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
reprinted in 1 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY
404-22 (Myron H. Nordquist ed., 1985) [hereinafter 1 COMMENTARY]. For comparison, the
UN membership in December 1982 was 157 and in June 1992 was 178.
4. R.P. Dhokalia, Reflection on International Law-Making and Its Progressive Development
in the Contemporary Era of Transition, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TRANSITION: ESSAYS IN
MEMORY OF JUDGE NAGENDRA SINGH 203, 228 (R.S. Pathak & R.P. Dhokalia eds., 1992).
Erik Suy, Innovation in International Law-Making Processes, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 187, 187 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1978).
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subjects which must be treated in global perspective.5 These UN conferenc-
es are often utilized as international treaty-making fora. The increasing
reliance on treaties as a formal source of international law6 signifies the need
for written, specific and obligatory instruments which to establish an
institutional framework to create a permanent legal regime for international
cooperation.
The reason the UN is increasingly looked to as a legitimate forum for
international law-making is its political and universal nature in which each
State holds only one, equal vote. Every State can participate with equal
footing in an international law-making process carried out under the authority
of the UN. The strongest support for the UN forum, of course, comes from
the developing countries who have no effective political, economic or
military bargaining power to influence the practice of States.' Even though
there are serious cleavages among developing countries with regard to the
substance of the law, they are united in their quest for full and effective
participation in the process of making international law.
This strong trend of utilizing the UN as a legitimate international law-
making forum with full and effective participation can be clearly demonstrat-
ed by an analysis of the UNCED law-making process. It is therefore
expected that the UN, and especially the conferences convened under its
auspices, will be the major forum for deliberate creation of international legal
instruments.' Based upon this expectation, the present article analyzes the
major features and trends of the process of international law-making in the
UN by comparing UNCED and UNCLOS II. 9
This article deals mainly with the processes of international law-making.
The process of international law-making greatly influences its substantive
5. The recent argument that the United Nations rather than the limited Consultative Parties
of the Antarctica Treaty should be involved in regulating the activities in Antarctica signifies the
increasing reliance on the United Nations as the forum for creating legal regime of global
interest. U.N. Press Release, GA/PS/2947 (Nov. 23, 1992).
6. The General Assembly declared that "multilateral treaties are an important means of
ensuring co-operation among States and an important primary source of international law."
G.A. Res. 37/110, Review of the multilateral treaty-making process, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 269, U.N. Doe. A/37/51 (1983). See also Barry Buzan, Negotiating by
Consensus: Developments in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
75 AJIL 324, 327-29 (1981).
7. See EDWARD MCWINNEY, UNITED NATIONS LAW MAKING 56, 76 (1984) (Third World
preference for "democratic" instruments of law making such as the UN General Assembly
resolutions).
8. This expectation is already being realized. The UN is preparing for a convention to
combat decertification and established an intergovernmental negotiating committee for this
purpose under the auspices of the General Assembly. G.A. Res 47/188, U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., U.N. Doe. A/RES/47/188 (1993).
9. Even though the interaction between international instruments so created and custom poses
an interesting phenomena in international law-making process, this topic will not be dealt with
in the present study. Also, the present article mainly focuses on the process of international law-
making in the United Nations conferences and will not deal directly with the "law-making
activities" of the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations, although these
activities also come under the purview of international law-making process in the United
Nations.
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outcome. It is not an overstatement that the decisions regarding organiza-
tional and procedural matters in the process often determine the trend of
negotiations in favor of a certain group of States. This is why the negotia-
tors devote a great amount of their effort to gaining acceptance for their
preferred organizational and procedural rules over others.
From an international legal point of view, what is most important with
respect to the international law-making process is to explore the organi-
zational and procedural factors which contribute to a wider, hopefully
universal, acceptance of the outcome of that process such that the internation-
al community firmly agrees on a set of rules by which all States abide.'0
This is crucial when the international community is in transition and,
simultaneously, the law is undergoing a profound change. The law of the
sea and international environmental law are among those fields of interna-
tional law which have been experiencing such a change.
Thus, this article analyzes the processes of UNCED and UNCLOS III
to explore the major features and trends in international law-making and to
examine what improvements and modifications States considered necessary
to achieve the goal of universal acceptance." The key words which will
emerge from the analysis are democratization and efficiency of the interna-
tional law-making process.
The comparative analysis of UNCED and UNCLOS III shall highlight
the importance of the process of international law-making. More important-
ly, it shall demonstrate the major features and trends of the international law-
making process which are less influenced by the subject matter of the
particular conference. Thus, the conclusion reached at the end of the article
can be applied to future international law-making conferences in a variety of
fields. The negotiators at UNCED were very much aware of the past experi-
ence of UNCLOS III and consequently tried to avoid its mistakes while
emulating its successes. This fact justifies the comparative analysis of
UNCED and UNCLOS 111.12
10. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 193 (1990)
(the process of rule-making is important to the legitimacy-or the voluntary compliance pull-of
the rule itself).
11. See Paul Szasz, Improving the International Legislative Process, 9 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 519, 533 (1979) (the necessity for such a study is recognized).
12. Though this article explores the major features and trends of the international law-
making process in the UN by comparing UNCED and UNCLOS In, the emphasis is on the
former. This is so because there has already been extensive research and analysis on the process
of UNCLOS II, while there has not yet been a systematic analysis of the UNCED process. For
a very brief account of the UNCED process, including those of the Climate Convention and the
Biodiversity Convention, see 1 REv. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 240 (1992) (special
issue on UNCED).
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II. THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS IN UNCED: UNIQUE FEATURES
A. An Overview of the Process: A Multi-Fora Process
The most interesting feature of the UNCED process is that it was a
multi-fora process. Strictly and formally speaking, UNCED itself is the
Conference which was convened by the General Assembly 3 and was held
at Rio de Janeiro from June 3-14, 1992. The Conference adopted three non-
binding documents: the Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development (the Rio Declaration), and the "Forests Statement." 6
These documents were prepared by the Preparatory Committee for UNCED
(PrepCom). At the same Conference, two conventions prepared in different
bodies were opened for signature.
The PrepCom was established by the General Assembly in December
1989'7 to "prepare draft decisions for the Conference and submit them to
the Conference for consideration and adoption."'" It held one organiza-
tional session in March 1990'9 and four substantive sessions before the
Conference.2' Under the chairmanship of Tommy Koh,2 the PrepCom
established two working groups and later one legal working group and
produced three documents to be adopted by the Conference. After Pre-
Conference consultation on June 1-2, 1992,' the Conference was opened
on June 3. The Main Committee, chaired by Tommy Koh, was the focal
13. G.A. Res. 44/228, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 151, U.N. Doc. A/44/49
(1990) (1 1 of Resolution I).
14. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 151/26 (Vol. I-l1) (1992).
15. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted June 14, 1992, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev.1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
16. Non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles for a global consensus on the
management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests, adopted June 13,
1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/6/Rev.1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992).
17. G.A. Res. 44/228, supra note 13 (1 1 of Resolution I).
18. Id. at 1 8 of Resolution II (other mandates were to draft the agenda for the Conference,
and to adopt guidelines for States to take a harmonized approach in their preparations and
reporting).
19. See Report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, Organizational Sess., U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 48,
U.N. Doc. A/44/48 (1989) [hereinafter UNCED PrepCom Report, Org. Sess.l.
20. See Report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, 1st Sess., U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc.
A/45/46 (1990) [hereinafter UNCED PrepCom Report, 1st Sess.]; 2nd Sess., U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., Supp. No. 48, Part I, U.N. Doc. /46/48 (1991) [hereinafter UNCED PrepCom Report,
2nd Sess.]; 3rd Sess., U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 48, Part II, U.N. Doc. A/46/48
(1991) [hereinafter UNCED PrepCom Report, 3rd Sess.]; Report of the Preparatory Committee
for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development on the Work of Its Fourth
Session, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/128 (1992) [hereinafter UNCED PrepCom Report, 4th
Sess.].
21. Tommy Koh was the president of the latter part of UNCLOS III.
22. Report of UNCED, Vol IV, supra note 3, at 4. The details of this consultation is
reported in U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 15 1/L. 1, but the present writer was unable to refer to it.
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negotiating body which established eight "contact groups" to facilitate the
negotiation.23 The Conference adopted all three documents, the Agenda 21,
the Rio Declaration and the Forests Statement, by consensus.
One of the two conventions opened for signature during the Conference
was the Framework Convention on Climate Change (Climate Convention)2'.
After scientific assessments were completed by the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), which was established jointly by the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), 8 the General Assembly established the Intergovern-
mental Negotiating Committee on Climate Change (INC on Climate
Change)2' to prepare a draft convention. The INC on Climate Change held
its first session in February 1991 during which it established two working
groups' and held four other sessions.' At the resumed fifth session in
April to May 1992, the Climate Convention was adopted, and at UNCED it
23. Id. at 18.
24. Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted May 9, 1992, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 849 (1992).
25. UNEP Governing Council Decision 14/20, United Nations Environment Programme:
Report of the Governing Council, 14th Sess, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess, Supp. No. 25, Annex II,
at 71, U.N. Doc. A/42/25 (1987) [hereinafter Report of the Governing Council, 14th Sess.].
Three working groups were established in November 1988 to deal with (1) scientific assessment,
(2) evaluation of impacts, and (3) formulation of response strategies of climate change. Report
of the Secretary-General:Protection of global climate for present and future generations of
mankind, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doe. A/44/484, at 5-6 (1989). For the reports
submitted by them, see the Overview in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
280-94 (Robin Churchill & David Freestone eds., 1991) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE]. The policymakers summary and the report of the Working Group
I is reproduced in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE
IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990). The report by the Working
Group I is reproduced in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES (Island Press, 1991).
26. G.A. Res. 45/212, U.N. GAOR, Sess. 45th, Supp. No. 49, at 147, U.N. Do. A/45/49
(1990) (operative 1: "Decides to establish a single intergovernmental negotiating process under
the auspices of the General Assembly . . . for the preparation by an Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee of an effective framework convention on climate change. . .).
27. See Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention
on Climate Change on the Work of Its First Session, U.N. Doe. A/AC.237/6 (1991) [hereinafter
INC on Climate Report, 1st Sess.].
28. See Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention
on Climate Change on the Work of Its Second Session, Held at Geneva from 19 to 28 June 1991,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/9 (1991) [hereinafter INC on Climate Report, 2d Sess.]; Report of the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on
the Work of Its Third Session, Held at Nairobi from 9 to 20 September 1991, U.N. Doe.
A/AC.237/12 (1991) [hereinafter INC on Climate Report, 3d Sess.]; Report of the Intergovern-
mental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the Work of
Its Fourth Session, Held at Geneva from 9 to 20 December 1991, U.N. Do. A/AC.237/15
(1992) [hereinafter INC on Climate Report, 4th Sess.]; Report of the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the Work of the First
Part of Its Fifth Session, Held at New York from 18 to 28 February 1992, U.N. Doe.
A/AC.237/18 (Part I) (1992) [hereinafter INC on Climate Report, 5th Sess. Part 1]; Report of
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change
on the Work of the Second Part of Its Fifth Session, Held at New York from 30 April to 9 May
1992, U.N. Doe. A/AC.237/18 (Part I) (1992) [hereinafter INC on Climate Report, 5th Sess.
Part I1].
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was opened for signature. As of June 29, 1992, 155 States and the EEC had
signed the Convention.29
The second convention opened for signature during the Conference was
the Convention on Biological Diversity (Biodiversity Convention).30 This
convention was prepared by the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and
Technical Experts on Biological Diversity (Legal WG on Biodiversity) which
was later renamed the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Convention on Biological Diversity (INC on Biodiversity). The Legal WG
on Biodiversity was established by the Governing Council of UNEP in
19893' and considered the draft convention submitted by the UNEP
secretariat. 32  After revising the draft five times, the INC on Biodiversity
sent the final draft for adoption at the Conference for Adoption of the Agreed
Text of the Convention on Biological Diversity in May 1992. 33  The
Convention was signed by 157 States and the EEC at the Conference.34
Thus, the PrepCom-UNCED process, the Climate Convention process
and the Biodiversity Convention process were institutionally separate and
were pursued in different fora with different procedures and organizational
29. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 24 at 849 note *.
30. Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted May 22, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818
(1992).
31. UNEP Governing Council Decision 15/34, United Nations Environment Programme:Re-
port of the Governing Council, 15th Session, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 25, at 161,
U.N. Doc. A/44/25 (1989) (operative 6) [hereinafter Report of the Governing Council, 15th
Sess.]. UNEP Governing Council Decision 16/42, United Nations Environment Programmes :Re-
port of the Governing Council, 16th Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 25, at 100,
U.N. Doc. A/46/25 (1991) (operative 1) [hereinafter Report of the Governing Council, 16th
Sess.]. The General Assembly endorsed these decisions. G.A. Res. 44/229, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 155, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1990) (operative 22).
32. See the following reports. Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical
Experts on Biological Diversity of the Work of Its First Session (Nairobi, 19-23 November 1990),
U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div/WG.2/I/4 (1990) [hereinafter Legal WG on Biodiversity Report, 1st
Sess.]. Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Biological
Diversity on the Work of Its Second Session (Nairobi, 25 Feb.-6 Mar. 1991), U.N. Doc.
UNEP/Bio.Div./WG.2/2/5 (1991) [hereinafter Legal WG on Biodiversity Report, 2d Sess.];
Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Convention on Biological Diversity
on the Work of Its Third SessionlFifth Negotiating Session (Geneva, 25 Nov.-4 Dec., 1991),
U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div/N5-INC.3/4 (1991) [hereinafter INC on Biodiversity Report, 5th
Sess.]. I referred to a Spanish version for the 4th session. Informe del Comite Intergubern-
amental de Negociacion de un Convenio Sobre la Diversidad Biologica Acerca de la Labor
Relizada en el Cuarto Periodo de Sesiones de Negociacion/Segundo Periodo de sesiones del cin,
PNUMA Comite Intergubernamenta de Negociacion de un Convenio Sobre la Diversidad
Biologica, Cuarto periodo de sesiones de negociacion/segundo periodo de sesiones del cin
(Nairobi, 23 de Sept. a 2 de Oct. de 1991), U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div/N4-INC.2/5 (1991)
[hereinafter INC on Biodiversity Report, 4th Sess.]. I was unable to refer to the reports of third
negotiating/INC first session (24 June to 3 July 1991), 6th negotiating/INC 4th session (6-15
Feb. 1992), and 7th negotiating/INC 5th session (11-19 May 1992). The document number for
the first one is: U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div/INC.3/11. But I was able to refer to Fourth Revised
Draft Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc. UNEPIBio.Div/N6-INC.4/2 (1991) and
Fifth Revised Draft Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc. UNEPIBio.Div/N7-INC.5/2
(1992).
33. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 30, at 818, note *
34. Id.
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structures. In fact, this separation was a result of arduous negotiations and
was a deliberate decision of the negotiators. On the other hand, the UN
made its effort to coordinate these three fora in order to achieve efficiency
and to avoid duplication. Because of this interrelationship among the three
fora, it is justified to treat them as one international law-making process
which I call the UNCED process.35
B. Quest for Effective Participation
The UNCED process had been effectively initiated 36 when the World
Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission)
submitted a report entitled "Our Common Future" in April 1987.11 The
report recommended to the General Assembly that it prepare a Declaration
and a Convention on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Develop-
ment. 38 Also of significance in this year was the report submitted by UNEP
entitled "Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond." 39 This
report urged the conclusion of conventions in fields of climate change and
protection of biological diversity.'
After the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972,
UNEP was established with its decision-making body "the Governing
35. Please refer to the timetable at the end of this article.
36. In this article, I generally follow the analytical framework suggested by the Secretary-
General of the U.N. Report of the Secretary-General: Review of the Multilateral Treaty-Making
Process, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/35/312 (1980) [hereinafter SG Report on
Treaty-Making Process]. See also Report of the Working Group on the Review of the
Multilateral Treaty-Making Process: Review of the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process, U.N.
GAOR, 6th Comm., 37th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/37/L.29 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Report on
Treaty-Making]; Report of the Working Group on the Review of the Multilateral Treaty-Making
Process.: Review of the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/38/L.28 (1983)[hereinafter 1983 Report on Treaty-Making]; Report of the Working Group
on the Review of the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process: Review of the Multilateral Treaty-
Making Process, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/39/L.12 (1984) [hereinafter 1984
Report on Treaty-Making].
37. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE(1987). This Commission is established by G.A. Res. 38/161, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp.
No. 47, at 131, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1983). For an overview of the work and the member of
the Commission, see OUR COMMON FUTURE at 352 (Annex 2).
38. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 37, at 332-333.
39. Report of the Governing Council, 14th Sess., supra note 25, at 96. This report was
submitted by an open-ended intergovernmental intersessional preparatory committee established
in 1983. UNEP Governing Council Decision 11/3 Part Six, United Nations Environment
Programme: Report of the Governing Council, 11th Sess., U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No.
25, at 28, U.N. Doc. A/38/25 (1983). The members of the Committee, Algeria, Argentina,
Austria, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, FRG,
Greece, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Netherlands, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Switzerland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR,
were decided by UNEP Governing Council Decision 12/1 Part II, United Nations Environment
Programme: Report of the Governing Council, 12th Sess., U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No.
25, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/39/25 (1984).
40. Report of the Governing Council, 14th Sess., supra note 25, at 125.
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Council" comprised of 58 States,4' less than a third of the current UN
membership. UNEP was also a technical body mainly concerned with
scientific and information matters. 2 Through its discreet and arduous
work,43 .a substantial groundwork for UNCED was prepared by UNEP,
culminating in the above mentioned "Environmental Perspective." Until
1987, the General Assembly of the UN had assumed only an endorsing role
regarding the work done by UNEP."
However, this universally represented political organ of the UN could
not remain an idle onlooker once an international law-making process had
been effectively initiated in a field where important interests of States were
at stake. The developing countries mobilized their efforts to make the
General Assembly the focus of the UNCED process. The developing
countries demanded their effective participation in the international law-
making process. In order to achieve this, they preferred an universally
represented forum. Some of the contentious issues in the three processes
demonstrate the effort and the success of the developing countries' quest for
effective participation in the international law-making process.
1. PrepCom-UNCED Process
In 1988, the General Assembly took a definitive step toward commenc-
ing the Conference when it requested States and UNEP to submit their views
on the question of convening a UN conference on the environment and
development. 5 UNEP, by its decision 15/3 of May 1989," gave detailed
elements to be considered for inclusion in a G.A. resolution. It identified
eight environmental issues to be considered at the Conference and recom-
mended that the Governing Council of UNEP should be the Preparatory
Committee of the Conference. Additionally, this Committee was to be "open
on a basis of equality to all State Members of the United Nations or members
of a specialized agency or of the International Atomic Energy Agency. "'
41. G.A. Res. 2997 (XXVII), U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 43, U.N. Doe.
A/8730 (1972) (the 58 members are divided as follows: 16 for African States, 13 for Asian
States, 6 for Eastern European States, 10 for Latin American States, and 13 for Western
European and other States).
42. Id. at 2 of Resolution I.
43. See generally Carol Annette Petsonk, The Role of the UNEP in the Development of
International Environmental Law, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 351 (1990).
44. See G.A. Res. 42/187, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 154, U.N. Doe.
A/42/49 (1988).
45. G.A. Res. 43/196, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 147, U.N. Doe. A/43/49
(1988). See also the draft resolution submitted by Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands,
Norway and Sweden, U.N. Doe. A/C.2/43/L.36 (1988), Report of the Second Committee (Part
VIII): Development and International Economic Co-operation- Long-term Strategy for Sustainable
and Environmentally Sound Development, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., at 9, U.N. Doe.
A/43/915/Add.7 (1988).
46. Report of the Governing Council, 15th Sess., supra note 31, at 115.
47. Id. at 118.
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The reason for utilizing the Governing Council, even though the new
Committee would have no resemblance to it, was that "the Council, as the
authoritative body on environmental matters, could provide guidance to the
preparatory committee. "48
During the debate in 1989 both in UNEP and in the General Assembly,
the choice of forum for the preparatory committee of the Conference became
one of the major contentious issues. The developed countries generally
favored UNEP playing a central role in preparing instruments to be adopted
at the Conference.' On the contrary, the developing countries, including
India,-' Brazil"' and Mexico,52 expressed the view that the General As-
sembly and a preparatory committee under its auspices should be the main
forum for international law-making in the environmental field.
The opposing approaches were represented in two draft resolutions, one
submitted by the European Community (EC)53 and the other by the Group
of 77 (G-77).54 The EC draft was identical to the one recommended by the
Governing Council of UNEP with respect to the preparatory committee. 55
The G-77 draft proposed an independent Preparatory Committee for UNCED
under the auspices of the General Assembly. The latter one prevailed
becoming G.A. Resolution 44/228.56 Thus, this resolution effectively
severed the institutional continuity of the PrepCom from UNEP.
Why did the developing countries insist on this point, especially when
the EC draft also guaranteed their participation? There are two conceivable
reasons. First, the developing countries wanted to sever the continuity with
48. Id. at 32.
49. For example, Norway, Sweden, and France favored the Governing Council to constitute
the preparatory body for UNCED. Report of the Secretary-General: Question of the Convening
of a United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/44/256/Add.1, at 24 (1989) and U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., at 13, U.N. Doc.
A/44/256/Add.2 (1989). The Japanese representative said it is important to strengthen the role
of UNEP. U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., at 59-60, U.N. Doc. A/44/PV.85 (1989).
50. U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., at 46, U.N. Doc. A/44/PV.85 (1989)
(reserving its position on a provision endorsing UNEP decisions).
51. Id. at 56-57 (stating that the preparatory process of the Conference itself should become
the focus of the efforts, including those already under way).
52. United Nations Environment Programme: Report of the Governing Council, 2d Special
Sess., U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 25, at 13-14, U.N. Doc. A/45/25 (1990) [hereinafter
Report of the Governing Council, Second Special Sess.] (declaring that the General Assembly
as well as the PrepCom for UNCED have a major role to play in recommending criteria for the
drafting of the climate convention).
53. U.N. Doc. A/C.2/44/L.58 (1989), Report of the Second Committee (Part VIII):
Development and international economic co-operation-Environment, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
at 41, U.N. Doc. A/44/746/Add.7 (1989) [hereinafter EC Draft of 1989].
54. U.N. Doc. A/C.2/44/L.55 (1989), Report of the Second Committee (Part VIII):
Development and international economic co-operation-Environment, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
at 33, U.N. Doc. A/44/746/Add.7 (1989) [hereinafter G-77 Draft of 1989].
55. EC Draft of 1989, supra note 53, at 44.
56. G.A. Res. 44/228, supra note 13, at 154 (decided to establish the Preparatory
Committee for UNCED, which "shall be open to all States Members of the UN or members of
the specialized agencies, with the participation of observers, in accordance with the established
practice of the General Assembly").
9
Shibata: International Law-Making Process in the United Nations: Comparati
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1993
26 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
UNEP since the work done by UNEP up until then was generally controlled
by developed countries without effective participation of developing
countries. They did not want the Governing Council's previous work to
infiltrate into the international law-making process unchecked by them. In
short, they wanted to start the international law-making process afresh.57
Second, the location of the preparatory sessions was a real concern for
developing countries. They wanted the sessions to be held where they could
effectively participate without incurring extra financial burden. The UN
Headquarters in New York or Geneva, where most of the States have their
permanent missions, was a preferred place to the UNEP Headquarters in
Nairobi."8 Resolution 44/228 designated two sessions in New York and
Geneva, and one session in Nairobi. 9 The question concerning the choice
of forum, therefore, was inextricably linked to the concept of effective
participation by developing countries in the international law-making process.
Another development of interest with regard to the PrepCom-UNCED
process was the establishment of a voluntary fund for the purpose of assisting
developing countries to participate fully and effectively in the Conference and
in its preparatory process. Paragraph 15 of Part II of Resolution 44/228
established the fund and invited Governments to contribute to it. 60 The
General Assembly repeatedly urged States to contribute to the fund, and as
a result, the PrepCom-UNCED process was generally attended by a large
number of delegations. 61  The Conference itself was attended by a record
number of 176 State delegations.
2. Climate Convention Process
The quest for effective participation by developing countries was much
more acute in the process leading to the adoption of the Climate Convention.
This was because their interests were more at stake in this process as it
directly concerned the issue of development and the final outcome of the
process was to be a legally-binding treaty. The choice of forum, again,
became the major issue.
UNEP was the leading body to respond to the problem of climate
57. This does not, however, rule out the contribution of the work of UNEP to the newly
formed preparatory body. In fact, the G.A. resolution specifically mentioned UNEP
contribution "on the basis of guidelines and requirements to be established by the PrepCom."
G.A. Res. 44/228, supra note 13, at 154-55 (1 9 of Resolution II).
58. G-77 draft specifically mentioned that the PrepCom be established at the UN
Headquarters in New York and that the sessions be held in New York and Nairobi. G-77 Draft
of 1989, supra note 54, at 39.
59. G.A. Res. 44/228, supra note 13, at 154 ( 2 of Resolution 1I).
60. Id. at 155 ( 15 of Resolution II).
61. The Organizational Session (NY)-137 countries; the First Session (Nairobi)-94
countries; the Second Session (Geneva)-127 countries; the Third Session (Geneva)-148
countries; and Fourth Session (NY)-165 countries. The Bolivian representative, speaking on
behalf of G-77, complained of the low participation at the first session of PrepCom. U.N.
GAOR 2d Comm., 45th Sess., 39th mtg., at 9-10, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/45/SR.39 (1990).
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change, and it established IPCC in 1988 to continue this momentum and
sought to be the main forum for the preparation of the Climate Convention.
In fact, this was the general expectation of the developed countries62 and of
the Western scholars.63 Even the General Assembly seemed to support the
leading role played by UNEP and IPCC until 1989.' However, the
potential conflict was already apparent. In 1988 one developing country ex-
pressed the view that the General Assembly as "the parliament of mankind"
should take the initiative on the issue of climate change.65 G.A. Resolution
44/207 adopted in 1989 contained the following paragraph:
Reaffirms that, owing to its universal character, the United Nations system,
through the General Assembly, is the appropriate forum for concerted
political action on global environmental problem[.]'
As the work by IPCC progressed, the developing countries increasingly
expressed their view that IPCC should not be a negotiating body for the
preparation of the Convention67 because its work method and organs did not
ensure their effective participation. The developing countries complained of
the proliferation of meeting locations and that the meeting dates coincided.6"
With lack of financial and human resources, the developing countries could
not participate in all the meetings sponsored by IPCC. The effort by IPCC
to ensure that the developing countries participate69 could not drastically
62. U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 43d Sess, 44th mtg., at 9 (UK), 11-12 (U.S.), U.N. Doc.
A/C.2/43/SR.44 (1988). U.N. GAOR2d Comm., 43d Sess., 25th mtg., at 13-14 (U.S.), U.N.
Doc. A/C.2/43/SR.25 (1988).
63. Catherine Tinker, Environmental Planet Management by the United Nations: An Idea
Whose Time Has Not Yet Come? 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 793, 814-15 (1990) (stating
that IPCC should be a drafting forum for a global warming convention).
64. G.A. Res. 43/53, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 133, U.N. Doc. A/43/49(1989). See also G.A. Res. 44/207, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 130, U.N. Doc.
A/44/49 (1990) (1 10).
65. U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 43d Sess., 25th mtg., supra note 62, at 4-6 (Malta). The
Egyptian representative cast doubt on the role of IPCC and requested it be under the supervision
of the UNEP. U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 43d Sess. 44th mtg., supra note 62, at 12.
66. G.A. Res. 44/207, supra note 64 at 5.
67. Report of the Governing Council, 15th Sess., supra note 31, at 57-58.
68. For example, IPCC in 1990 had following meetings: WG I-meeting of lead authors in
Edinburgh, Scot., Feb. 26 to Mar. 3; WG fl-meeting of co-chairmen of the 7 subgroups in
Nalchik, USSR, Feb. 24 to Mar. 2 and plenary session in Moscow, USSR, Mar. 28 to 31; WG
Ell-plenary session in Geneva, Switz., June 5 to 8; Special Committee-plenary in Washington
D.C., Feb. 9 and drafting group meeting in Paris, Fr., April 5 to 6. U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.16/
21/Add.3, at 4-5 (1991).
69. The General Assembly and UNEP repeatedly requested to ensure the participation of
developing countries. G.A. Res. 44/207, supra note 64 at 10th preambular and operative
9. UNEP Governing Council Decision SS.11/3 B, Report of the Governing Council, Second
Special Sess., supra note 52, at 23 (operative 1). IPCC even established a Special Committee
on the Participation of Developing Countries and IPCC Trust Fund to support their participation.
IPCC, Overview, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note
25, at 280, 290-91.
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change the situation.7' Another factor which made the developing countries
turn against IPCC was that they were vastly under-represented in principal
posts established by the IPCC. For example, the Working Group on Re-
sponse Strategies (WG III) of IPCC was chaired by the United States, with
five co-chairmen from Canada, China, Malta, the Netherlands and Zimba-
bwe. Out of 9 co-chair posts of the subgroups of WG III, only one went to
Africa (Zimbabwe) and three to Asia (China, Japan and India). No Latin
American or Caribbean States were represented.71 It is understandable that
the developed countries dominate important posts in a body like IPCC where
scientific and technical expertise is required to become a member. However,
this was precisely the reason that developing countries disliked IPCC and
also, to a certain extent, UNEP.
"The negotiating process should be organized and conducted in such a
manner as to ensure openness, transparency, universality and legitimacy."72
Because of the lack of effective participation by developing countries, IPCC
was no longer conceived as an universal and legitimate body to proceed with
the law-making process.73 The General Assembly, in its resolution 45/212,
established the INC on Climate Change under its own auspices. It was
entrusted with the mandate to prepare an effective framework convention on
climate change.74 The IPCC report was deliberately undermined to the
status of "inputs for the negotiation." 75  Previously it was given the status
of "the basis for the negotiation."76
The developing countries again succeeded in their effort to sever the
institutional continuity from a body in which they could not fully participate,
and they succeeded in moving the international law-making forum to a body
in which they could participate effectively. It is undeniable that the IPCC
reports played a major role in arousing the awareness of both the general
public and the State delegates for the need for climate protection, but IPCC
was not a suitable forum for the international law-making process since
70. The participation was generally low. The first session was attended by 30 countries, and
the second session by 43 countries. Report of the Secretary-General: Protection of Global
Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., at 5-6, U.N.
Doc. A/44/484 (1989).
71. CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES, supra note 25, at xiii.
72. The Ad Hoc Working Group of Government Representatives to Prepare for Negotiation
on a Framework Convention on Climate Change, recommendation, Report of the Secretary
General:Progress achieved in the implementation of resolution 44/207 on protection of global
climate for present and future generations of mankind, U.N. GAOR., 45th Sess., at 4, U.N.
Doc. A/45/696 (1990) [hereinafter Recommendation by WGGR of 1990].
73. See U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 45th Sess., 40th mtg., at 7-8 (Mexico), 16-17 (China),
U.N. Doc. AIC.2/45/SR.40 (1990); U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 45th Sess., 43d mtg., at 10
(India), U.N. Doc. A/C.2/45/SR.43 (1990).
74. G.A. Res. 45/212, supra note 26 at 1.
75. Id. at 15.
76. Report of the Second Committee:Protection of global climate for present and future
generations of mankind, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/45/851 (1990) [hereinafter
58 Countries Draft of 1990].
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developing countries could not effectively participate.
Similar to the PrepCom-UNCED process, the INC on Climate Change
had a special voluntary fund to assist developing countries to participate fully
and effectively in the process.' For example, at the fifth session of the
INC on Climate Change, 87 delegations out of 115 participants from
developing countries were supported by the fund. 78  Also, other measures
were utilized to effectuate the participation of developing countries. These
included the decision to hold no more than two meetings at any one time
within the INC, and to hold no inter-sessional meetings of INC working
groups or any subgroups.79
3. Biodiversity Convention Process
As the Executive Director of UNEP, Dr. Mostafa K. Tolba proudly
stated that the Biodiversity Convention was "the UNEP-brokered conven-
tion."' It is true that UNEP and various working groups established by it
were the main bodies which established the scientific groundwork for the
preparation of the Biodiversity Convention.8' It is also true that the
negotiation process took place in Legal WG on Biodiversity established by
the Governing Council of UNEP, and that when INC on Biodiversity was to
succeed the Legal WG, the Governing Council of UNEP reaffirmed that this
change of name would not in any way affect the continuity of the process.'
But this was actually a case of sour grapes because the negotiators
entrusted only one subject to UNEP, and moreover, it was the subject in
which they were least interested among the three. It seems that the
developing countries entrusted the preparation of the Biodiversity Convention
to UNEP in order to obtain the General Assembly's control over the other
77. G.A. Res. 45/212, supra note 26 at 10. See also G.A. Res. 46/169, U.N. GAOR,
46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 130-31, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1992) ( 5, inviting more contribution
to the Fund).
78. INC on Climate Report, 5th Sess. Part I, supra note 28, at 11.
79. Decision of the Committee 1/1 Annex III, INC on Climate Report, 1st Sess., supra note
27, at 24.
80. Unofficial paper, UNEP Feature, Breakthrough in Nairobi, (May 22, 1992) (available
from the Public Inquiries Unit in New York).
81. Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity (Expert WG on Biodiversity),
UNEP Governing Council Decision 14/26, Report of the Governing Council, 14th Sess., supra
note 25, at 78. See Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Work of Its First Session
(Geneva, 16-18 November 1988), U.N. Do. UNEP/Bio.Div. 1/3 (1989) [hereinafter Expert WG
on Biodiversity Report, 1st Sess.]; Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Work of Its
Second Session in Preparation for a Legal Instrument on Biological Diversity of the Planet
(Geneva, 19-23 February 1990), U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div.2/3 (1990) [hereinafter Expert WG
on Biodiversity Report, 2d Sess.]; Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Work of Its Third
Session in Preparation for a Legal Instrument on Biological Diversity of the Planet (Geneva, 9-
13 July 1990), U.N. Do. UNEP/Bio.Div.3/12 (1990) [hereinafter Expert WG on Biodiversity
Report, 3d Sess.]. A Sub-Working Group on Biotechnology (SWGB) was also established. See
Final Report of the Sub-Working Group on Biotechnology (Nairobi, 14-17 November 1990),
U.N. Doe. UNEP/Bio.Div/SWGB. 1/5/REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Biotechnology Report].
82. Report of the Governing Council, 16th Sess., supra note 31, at 104 ( 1 and 2).
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two more important processes.
Still, effective participation was an unyielding demand of the developing
countries. The Legal WG and INC on Biodiversity were open-ended so that,
technically, all States could participate in them.' Additionally, the
Governing Council of UNEP called upon Governments to provide necessary
financial and technical resources to enable full and effective participation of
the developing countries.' In response to this call, some States did actually
provide these resources.' Notwithstanding these measures, the participa-
tion in the Biodiversity process was generally low compared to other process-
es' because of lack of interest and the difficulty in participating. s7
The UNCED process clearly demonstrates the unyielding demand of the
developing countries for "full and effective participation""8 in the interna-
tional law-making process from its beginning. The concept of effective
participation was inextricably linked to the legitimacy of the negotiating
forum, and consequently, to the legitimacy of its outcome. In order to
achieve effective participation, the choice of negotiating forum was of critical
importance. Also, the financial assistance was needed to make sure that the
open-ended forum be filled with delegates.
Another fact which is worthy of our notice is the general acceptance of
this demand by the developed countries. No State opposed the general
concept of effective participation in the international law-making process.
Actually, the establishment of a fund to assist developing countries was a
proposal initially contained in the EC draft.8 9 Thus, the developed coun-
tries recognized the concept of effective participation as an indispensable
element of a legitimate forum for international law-making. What they were
concerned with was the efficiency of the law-making process.
Therefore, it is expected that, with the strong demand from developing
countries and the general acceptance of developed countries, the effective
participation of developing countries, through financial measures to effectuate
83. UNEP Governing Council Decision SS.1I/7, Report of the Governing Council, Second
Special Sess., supra note 52, at 31.
84. UNEP Governing Council Decision 15/34, Report of the Governing Council, 15th Sess.,
supra note 31, at 162.
85. Legal WG on Biodiversity Report, 2d Sess., supra note 32, at 17. (Australia, Denmark,
Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States
announced their pledges).
86. For example, only 70 countries participated at the first session of the Legal WG on
Biodiversity. Legal WG on Biodiversity Report, 1st Sess, supra note 32, at 4.
87. The meeting place must have had some negative effect. Rules of Procedure explicitly
state that the meetings shall take place in Nairobi unless otherwise decided. See U.N. Doc.
UNEP/Bio.Div/WG.2/2/5, Annex (Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure).
88. This phrase was repeated in many of the General Assembly resolutions. E.g., G.A.
Res. 44/228, supra note 13 at 1 15 of Resolution 1H; G.A. Res. 45/211, U.N. GAOR, 45th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 146, U.N. Doe. A/45/49 (1991) (1 8); G.A. Res. 45/212, supra note
26 at 1 10; G.A. Res. 46/168, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 130, U.N. Doe.
A/46/49 (1992) (operative 8: "adequate and full"); G.A. Res. 46/169, U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., Supp. No 49, at 131, U.N. Do. A/46/49 (1992) (1 5).
89. EC Draft of 1989, supra note 53 at 1 14.
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such participation, shall be a principle of the international law-making
process.
C. Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations
Another unique feature of the UNCED process was that a record number
of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) indirectly participated as
observers in the international law-making process. Not only was the
quantitative figure impressive' but the degree of their participation and the
semi-official status they acquired during the process were of such importance
that the international law-making process may never be the same after
UNCED. If the increase in participation of States could be described as a
horizontal expansion of participation, the participation of NGOs can be
described as a vertical expansion of participation in the international law-
making process. 91
In its first decision 1/1, the PrepCom, recognizing that the effective
contributions of NGOs in the preparatory process were in its interest, decided
to allow NGOs to make written presentations and to briefly address the
PrepCom meetings.' The Climate Convention process also invited NGOs
to make contributions to its preparatory process, taking into account decision
1/1 of the PrepCom.93 PrepCom decision 2/1 stipulated detailed procedures
to be followed for accreditation of NGOs to participate in the PrepCom meet-
ings. 4 And by G.A. Resolution 46/168, all NGOs accredited to participate
in the work of the PrepCom were invited to participate in the Conference as
observers.' At the Conference, many NGOs addressed the plenary
meetings in the same manner as the delegates from States and intergovern-
mental organizations.'
90. In the PrepCom-UNCED process, 11 NGOs (organizational sess), 42 NGOs (1st Sess.),
163 NGOs (2d Sess.), 253 NGOs (3d sess.) and more than 300 NGOs (4th sess.) participated
as observers. In Climate Convention process, 72 NGOs (1st Sess.), 38 NGOs (2d Sess.), 34
NGOs (3d Sess.), 45 NGOs (4th Sess.), 54 NGOs (5-1 Sess.) and 51 NGOs (5-2 Sess.)
participated as observers. In Biodiversity Process, 2 NGOs (Expert WG 1st Sess.), 2 NGOs
(Expert WG 2d Sess), 3 NGOs (Expert WG 3d Sess.), 2 NGOs (Legal WG 1st Sess.), 7 NGOs
(Legal WG 2d Sess.), 11 NGOs (Legal WG 4th Sess.), and 7 NGOs (Legal WG 5th Sess.)
participated as observers.
91. Professor Sands urges for an increasing role of NGOs in environmental protection,
especially in the enforcement area. See generally Philippe J. Sands, The Environment,
Community and International Law, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 393 (1989).
92. PrepCom Decision 1/1, UNCED PrepCom Report, 1st Sess., supra note 20, at 22.
93. G.A. Res. 45/212, supra note 26 at 1 19. See also, Rule 49 of Rules of Procedure of
INC on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. AIAC.237/2 (1991), Annex.
94. UNCED PrepCom Report, 2d Sess., supra note 20, at 21. The accredited NGOs are
listed in PrepCom Decision 2/2, id. at 22; PrepCom Decision 3/1, UNCED PrepCom Report,
3d Sess., supra note 20, at 27-31; and PrepCom Decision 4/1, UNCED PrepCom Report, 4th
Sess., supra note 20, at 33-55.
95. G.A. Res. 46/168, supra note 88 at 9(f).
96. See Report of UNCED Vol. IV, supra note 3, at 12-15.
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Even though they were not given any negotiating role in the process, 97
the NGOs' contribution to the international law-making process was highly
commended. 9 The General Assembly recommended that the follow-up
mechanism of the Conference, the Commission on Sustainable Development,
provide for NGOs to participate effectively in its work and contribute within
their areas of competence to its deliberation. 99
The NGOs' role in the international law-making process is still indirect
in the sense that they themselves may not be involved in an actual negotiation
and that their views may be reflected in the process only through State dele-
gates. However, the importance of their contribution to the international
law-making process has been clearly recognized during UNCED, and their
increasing involvement in the process is an irreversible trend.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UNCED
AND UNCLOS III PROCESSES
The unique features of the UNCED process discussed above represent
the progressive developments from previous international law-making
processes, especially that of UNCLOS III. The multi-fora process was one
facet of the separate-but-coordinated approach employed in UNCED which
could be considered an improvement from the comprehensive approach
employed in UNCLOS III. The quest for effective participation could be
considered as a reinforcement of the trend to achieve a more representative
forum in the international law-making process which has started in UNCLOS
III. This development with regard to the preparatory forum can be
characterized as democratization of the international law-making process in
the UN.
Through the comparative analysis of UNCED and UNCLOS III, I shall
demonstrate these developments along with other features and trends of the
international law-making process which will contribute to a wider acceptance
of the outcome of that process.
A. The Preparatory Fora and Democratization
of the International Law-Making Process
The Secretary-General's report stated that, generally speaking, the inter-
national law-making process in the UN is almost always a "multistage
process." The first stages of the formulation of an instrument are generally
97. PrepCom Decision 1/1, supra note 92, at 4(a). Rule 49 of Rules of Procedures of
INC on Climate Change, supra note 93.
98. See the statement by Fernando Collor, President of the UNCED, Report of UNCED,
Vol. IV, supra note 3, at 64; and the statement by Maurice Strong, Secretary-General of
UNCED, Id. at 71.
99. G.A. Res. 47/191, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 7(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/191
(1993).
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entrusted to some restricted body but the final stages always involve a
representative body whose membership generally coincides with the potential
scope of participation in the proposed instrument."° The same report also
suggested that once the law-making process has started, an initial draft of all
provisions, or at least of the substantive provisions, of the proposed
instrument must be prepared. 101 Therefore, the report recognized that,
from an organizational point of view, a preparatory forum is a restricted
body and, from a functional point of view, it is a body which prepares a
draft and that these two aspects usually coincide in the international law-
making process.
However, these characteristics were not observed in both the UNCED
and the UNCLOS III processes. There were three interesting features with
respect to the preparatory fora similar to both processes. First, the
International Law Commission (ILC) was not utilized, which brings up the
question of lawyers' role in the international law-making process. Second,
from an organizational point of view, the preparatory fora were not
restrictive and, in fact, there was a clear trend towards the opposite. Third,
from a functional point of view, the preparatory fora were unable to prepare
draft instruments.
1. ILC and the Role of Lawyers
One of the unique features of UNCLOS III was the fact that the
preparatory work was not assigned to ILC or a specialized expert body."°
There was in fact no serious consideration of possible ILC involvement in the
UNCLOS III preparatory process. There are several conceivable reasons for
this decision. 1° The most important explanation is that it was generally
recognized that the questions at UNCLOS III would not be purely legal.
Rather it involved political, economic, strategic and other considerations, and
it was considered that ILC would be inappropriate to deal with these issues.
Also of importance was the perception, especially of developing countries,
that ILC is under-represented and conservative in its approach. 'I
Similarly, in the UNCED process, there was no suggestion of entrusting
the preparatory work to ILC. Instead, the preparatory works for the
100. SG Report on Treaty-Making Process, supra note 36, at 5-6.
101. Id. at 16.
102. See Tommy T.B. Koh & Shanmugam Jayakumar, The Negotiating Process of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1 COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 46-50
(detailed analysis of the role, or lack of it, of ILC in UNCLOS III).
103. Id. at 49-50.
104. See generally MOHAMED EL BARADEI, THOMAS M. FRANCK & ROBERT TRACHTEN-
BERG, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION: THE NEED FOR A NEW DIRECTION 4-16
(UNITAR, 1981) [hereinafter ILC: NEW DIRECTION]. See also Thomas M. Franck & Mohamed
El Baradei, Current Development: The Codification and Progressive Development of Interna-
tional Law: A UNITAR Study of the Role and Use of the International Law Commission, 76 AJIL
630 (1982).
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UNCED process were entrusted to intergovernmental bodies like the INC on
Climate Change, the INC on Biodiversity and PrepCom. A number of
scientific and technical expert working groups were established in the
UNCED process, but they were all intergovernmental in nature and were not
given an official mandate to prepare draft instruments."5 In the case of
IPCC, the preparatory function was deliberately stripped away because of the
demand of developing countries.
The same reasons raised in the case of UNCLOS III for not utilizing ILC
could also apply to the UNCED process. The UNCED process involved
political, economic and scientific considerations which presumably cannot be
dealt with from a purely legal point of view. The under-representativeness
and conservative approach of ILC have not been modified in any significant
way."° It could be concluded, as Dhokalia did, that "[t]he ILC approach
appears to work better in the refinements of rules of traditional international
law, while special committee approach seems better suited to new interna-
tional law topics.""
Two observations should be made from the comparative analysis of
UNCED and UNCLOS III with respect to the issue of utilizing ILC and
international lawyers. First, there is a clearly recognizable trend that non-
political fora, like ILC,'0 were considered by States, especially developing
ones, to be inappropriate for the international law-making process in which
important interests of States are at stake. In this sense, this trend is parallel
to the States' tendency to avoid technical and scientific expert bodies like
IPCC to take control of the international law-making process. Mexico
declared that the elaboration of a convention is mainly a political, not
technical, endeavor which, as such, must be directed by governmental
representatives.'09
This observation should not be confused with the second observation
concerning the role of international lawyers in the international law-making
process. International lawyers played a vital role in facilitating the inter-
national law-making processes both in UNCLOS III and UNCED. For
example, in UNCLOS III, the Private Group on Settlement of Disputes was
composed of able international lawyers and was able to produce an
105. However, in the case of Expert WG on Biodiversity, even though the mandate of that
group was only to investigate the feasibility of creating a possible convention, it assumed the
preparatory function by recommending elements to be included in the convention. Strictly
speaking, elements are not a draft therefore not a preparatory work of a convention, but the
demarcation line between preparatory work and pre-preparatory work is becoming unclear.
106. ILC membership was enlarged to 34 from 25 in 1981 in order to be more representa-
tive of the international community. MCWHINNEY, supra note 7, at 102 (explaining the back-
ground of this enlargement).
107. Dhokalia, supra note 4, at 227.
108. This non-political nature of ILC is, of course, relative since quite a few members of
ILC are governmental officials, but they still serve on ILC in their individual capacity and
cannot represent the views of their governments.
109. Report of the Governing Council, Second Special Sess., supra note 52, at 13-14.
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acceptable draft."I In the fifth session of the Biodiversity Convention
negotiation, the Drafting Group of Lawyers was formed to review the text
from a legal point of view."' Most of the delegations in both UNCLOS
III and UNCED were full of international lawyers.
Therefore, what the States at UNCLOS III and UNCED tried to avoid
was not the international lawyers but non-political and non-representative
bodies becoming the main fora of international law-making. Though they
may no longer be the principal actors in the international law-making process
which is becoming more political and intergovernmental from the beginning,
international lawyers greatly facilitate the negotiation by providing legal
expertise especially in drafting stages of the international law-making
process. Also, ILC, with prominent legal experts, may be able to be
involved in the international law-making process by supporting the main
political intergovernmental law-making forum with specific mandate given
to it. This proposition, however, presupposes changes in ILC's structural
rigidity and in its working method. 2 It must become more responsive to
the immediate and specific needs of the main international law-making
forum.
2. The Representative Fora
As the Secretary-General's report stated, a preparatory forum entrusted
with the preparation of a draft instrument has usually been a restricted body.
This feature applies, in a sense, to the UNCLOS III preparatory forum which
was limited in its membership. Before the mandate to prepare a draft treaty
was entrusted, the Sea-Bed Committee established by the General Assembly
was originally composed of only 35 member States and was later increased
to 42.'3
When the General Assembly decided to convene a Conference, the Sea-
Bed Committee was enlarged by "44 members, appointed by the Chairman
of the First Committee in consultation with regional groups and taking into
account equitable geographical representation thereon[.] '' 4 The mandate
of this "Enlarged Sea-Bed Committee" was to prepare draft treaty articles for
110. Koh & Jayakumar, supra note 102, at 110 (The members included Louis Sohn of the
U.S., Galindo Pohl of El Salvador, A.O. Adede of Kenya, Willem Riphagen of the Nether-
lands).
111. INC on Biodiversity Report, 5th Sess., supra note 32, at 7, 16.
112. ILC: NEW DIRECTION, supra note 104, at 17-33 (especially the chamber proposal).
113. G.A. Res. 2340 (XXII), U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6716
(1967), reprinted in 1 COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 161 (establishing the Ad Hoc Sea-Bed
Committee). G.A. Res. 2467 (XXIII), U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc.
A/7218 (1968), reprinted in 1 COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 163 (establishing the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction).
114. G.A. Res. 2750 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970), reprinted in 1 COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 176 (operative 5 of Resolution C).
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the conference on the law of the sea. Thus, it became an official preparatory
forum in the UNCLOS III process. This decision is significant in two
aspects. First, there was a clear recognition that the participation of States
in the preparatory forum must be much larger than the body not entrusted
with the preparatory work. The number of participating States became 86
and was later increased by 4.115 Second, when it came to officially
deciding the members of a preparatory body, "equitable geographical
representation" became the explicit standard for choosing members. In
previous resolutions, there were no explicit mention of this standard. Even
though the Enlarged Sea-Bed Committee was a "restrictive forum" in the
sense that it was not open-ended, as Koh and Jayakumar declared, "[t]he Sea-
Bed Committee, although ostensibly engaged in preparatory work, was, in
effect, a mini-Conference. ' 116 It was, in fact, quite a big Conference.
This trend for "representative fora" was more conspicuous in UNCED
as discussed in Part II, Section B. All the preparatory fora in the UNCED
process were open-ended, and States took a step forward by ensuring the
representativeness of preparatory fora with financial and other measures to
effectuate the participation of developing countries. In the UNCED process,
States, especially developing countries, endeavored to enlarge the mem-
bership of preparatory fora, and as a result, the preparatory fora were no
longer restricted bodies but instead became universally represented bodies.
The universal participation in preparatory fora being achieved, the
demand of developing countries for representativeness then turned to the
number and the selection of officers of preparatory fora. The developing
countries generally favored a large number of officers and demanded strict
regional representation in selection of officers and in working groups. For
example, the number of Vice-Chairmen for the PrepCom proposed by EC
was 8"7 and that by G-77 was 21,118 but the final compromise was in-
creased to 39.119 The election of a bureau for INC on Climate Change was
originally based on "the need to reflect a balance of interests and specific
concern," 20 but this was amended to read as follows: "a Bureau ... shall
be elected, each of the five regional groups being represented by one mem-
115. G.A. Res. 2881 (XXVI), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971), reprinted in 1 COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 182 (operative 3).
116. Koh & Jayakumar, supra note 102, at 52.
117. EC Draft of 1989, supra note 53 (recommending one Chairman, eight Vice-Chairmen
and one Rapporteur).
118. G-77 Draft of 1989, supra note 54 (recommending one Chairman, 21 Vice-Chairmen
and one Rapporteur).
119. At the General Assembly, the specific number was not agreed upon where the
resolution only indicated that vice-chairmen be of "a substantial number." G.A. Res. 44/228,
supra note 13 at 3 of Resolution 1I. At the organization session of the PrepCom, 39 vice-
chairmen were elected. UNCED PrepCom Report, Org. Sess., supra note 19, at 5 (8 from Latin
American and Caribbean States, 11 from African States, 9 from Asian States, 4 from Eastern
European States, and 7 from Western European and Other States).
120. 58 Countries Draft of 1990, supra note 76, at 5 ( 9).
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ber. "121
Therefore, from the comparative analysis of UNCLOS III and UNCED,
we are able to discern a clear trend for "representativeness" not only in
preparatory fora but also in bureaus and working groups established by them.
The preparatory forum must be representative of the international community
in terms of quality (geographical representativeness) and quantity (large
participation).
3. Continuous Process
The third feature common to the UNCLOS III and UNCED processes
was that both failed to prepare a clear draft instrument before the negotiation
started. Thus, from a functional point of view as well there was no clear
distinction between the preparatory forum and the negotiating or "adoption"
forum.
In the UNCLOS III process, the Enlarged Sea-Bed Committee could not
produce a single preparatory document in the set of draft treaty articles,122
and still the General Assembly proceeded to convene the Conference in 1973,
as planned."2 It was only after the end of the third session of the Confer-
ence in 1975, when the Single Negotiating Text was worked out, that the
Conference had a single preparatory document. 24 It could be argued that
the negotiation had been effectively initiated from this moment,12s and the
Conference itself had undertaken the function of preparing a draft instrument.
Alternatively, it could be argued that the preparatory process had started in
1970 with the establishment of the Enlarged Sea-Bed Committee, and this
process continued right into the first three sessions of the Conference. Either
way, the structural change of the forum had only a minimal significance
regarding the functional continuity of the overall international law-making
process. 
26
This feature can be more clearly recognized in the UNCED process
121. G.A. Res. 45/212, supra note 26, at 11. At the second session of the Legal WG on
Biodiversity, the rules of procedure, which required a Bureau to be elected with due regard to
the principle of equitable geographical representation, was adopted and consequently the U.S.
dropped out from the Bureau. Legal WG on Biodiversity Report, 2d Sess., supra note 32, at 7-8.
122. Koh & Jayakumar, supra note 102, at 50.
123. G.A. Res. 3067 (XXVIm), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 25, at
188( 2).
124. Koh & Jayakumar, supra note 102, at 51.
125. Edward Miles complained of the "almost unending repetition of national positions" in
the first two sessions of the Conference. Edward Miles, An Interpretation of the Caracas
Proceedings, in LAW OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND 39, 40 (Law of the Sea Institute,
1975).
126. See Koh & Jayakumar, supra note 102, at 52 (arguing that one of the reasons that the
General Assembly proceeded to convene the Conference without a draft was that many
delegations felt that the Conference had already commenced, de facto, with the 1970 General
Assembly resolution and the enlargement of the Sea-Bed Committee, and the actual convening
of the Conference was more of a formality).
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where the preparatory and the negotiation processes were both undertaken in
universally represented fora. For example, the PrepCom was formally the
preparatory forum for UNCED, but substantively it cannot be distinguished
from the Conference itself as the preparation and the negotiation were
simultaneously undertaken in both the PrepCom and the Conference. 27 In
the Climate Convention process, there was no separate "adoption forum"
since the INC on Climate Change had functioned both as preparatory and
adoption fora.12
Therefore, from the comparative analysis of UNCED and UNCLOS III
processes, one can recognize the trend that the preparatory process and the
negotiation and adoption processes are becoming inseparable and continuous.
It would be better to view the work by the preparatory fora and the
negotiation and adoption fora as a continuous international law-making
endeavor rather than to artificially distinguish them.
By analyzing the international law-making processes of UNCLOS III and
UNCED, we are able to discern some important features and trends in the
international law-making process in the UN. First, there was a clear
recognition among States that the international law-making process is a
political process and should therefore be entrusted to an intergovernmental
forum. Second, that political body had to be representative of the interna-
tional community, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to be entrusted with
the preparation of international legal instruments. Third, the international
law-making process has become a continuous process as both the preparation
and negotiation-adoption functions were undertaken in a representative
forum.
These features and trends can be characterized as the democratization of
the international law-making process. Every State, as a sovereign State
without distinction to its political, economic and military powers, and
technological developments, has the right to participate from the beginning
in the international law-making process. The recent developments signify the
increasing recognition among States that they may even have the obligation
to ensure others' right to participate, especially developing countries. The
emphasis on the political and representative nature of the preparatory fora by
developing countries and the general acceptance of it by developed countries
have consolidated the trend toward the democratization of the international
127. The Agenda 21 and the Forests Statement were heavily bracketed indicating
disagreements at the end of the drafts submitted to the Conference and they cannot be
characterized as a set of agreed draft texts for adoption. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/4 (Part
I-IV)(1992) (Draft Agenda 21) and U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/6 (1992) (Draft Forests Statement).
On the other hand, the Rio Declaration contained no bracket and was adopted as it was at the
Conference. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5 (1992) (Draft Rio Declaration).
128. The issue of whether a separate conference for adoption of the Convention was
necessary became a question at the first part of the fifth session of the INC, but the INC
Chairman explained it was not necessary. INC on Climate Report, 5th Sess., supra note 28, at
9.
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law-making process. 9
The democratization of the international law-making process surely
contributes to the legitimacy of the process and consequently its outcome.
This in turn contributes to a wider acceptance of the international legal
instruments created in such a process. The democratization, however, has
a negative effect on the international law-making process which is similar to
any domestic legislative process. The efficiency and the protection of
minorities become the primary concern. Through the experience of two
conferences, the international community has devised some negotiating
techniques to address these problems, which I shall discuss in the next
section.
B. Modality of Negotiation: Comprehensive or Coordinated Approach
1. UNCLOS III: Comprehensive Approach
The comprehensive approach to the international law-making process in
UNCLOS III was effectively determined by the General Assembly and
included the following four factors. First, all the interrelated issues would
be dealt with together as a whole.130 Second, the outcome of the confer-
ence would be in a single instrument.' 3 ' Third, that instrument would be
a legally binding treaty. Fourth, the treaty would contain detailed provi-
sions. 112
The decision to pursue the process in this manner was the result of a
skillful diplomacy of Latin American and other coastal States.' Also,
there was pressure among the delegates that they should not pursue the
separate approach utilized in the first Law of the Sea Conference in 1958,
which resulted in four separate conventions, and States ratifying only those
which favored their particular interests." Thus, the comprehensive ap-
proach was deliberately chosen by the negotiators at UNCLOS III.
However, because of this approach, there were some undesirable side-
129. This is a horizontal democratization on the governmental level. The increasing
participation of NGOs points to the direction of vertical democratization of international law-
making process, but as I have discussed above, their involvement is still indirect. Therefore,
I would like to confine myself, at this time, to the discussion concerning horizontal democratiza-
tion of international law-making process.
130. G.A. Res. 2750 C (XXV), supra note 114, at third preambular paragraph (which calls
for the holding of "a comprehensive conference on the law of the sea").
131. G.A. Res. 3067 (XXVIII, supra note 123, at 3 (which states that the Conference's
mandate shall be to adopt "a convention dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea").
132. The fourth factor was the result of a negotiating strategy of the United States in order
to strictly limit the power of the Authority.
133. Koh & Jayakumar, supra note 102, at 36-37.
134. James K. Sebenius, Crafting a Winning Coalition: Negotiating a Regime to Control
Global Warming, in GREENHOUSE WARMING: NEGOTIATING A GLOBAL REGIME 69, 76 (World
Resources Institute, 1991). See also Robert D. Eustis, Note: Procedures and Techniques of
Multinational Negotiation: the LOS III Model, 17 VA. J. INT'L. 217, 230-231 (1977).
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effects which the negotiators did not foresee. First, the length of the
Conference-nine years-was directly attributable to this approach. The
agenda contained 25 very broad issues, and the decision to create a legally
binding treaty for all these issues made States more cautious in the negotia-
tion. Because of "the theory of interrelationship," delegates resorted to
delaying tactics in the negotiation of one issue hoping to obtain concessions
in negotiations of other issues. Without a clear time limit, the result of all
this was the longest intergovernmental law-making negotiation in the history
of the UN. 35
The second side-effect was that the negotiation became so complicated
that it was almost unmanageable. 36 Because of "the theory of interrela-
tionship," there was a wide variety of trade-offs between related and
unrelated issues. The Conference agreed to work on the basis of a "package-
deal" so as to stamp an official seal on those trade-offs made among the
delegates. There were a dozen official and private negotiating groups trying
to work out these packages, usually at informal meetings.' The negotia-
tion at UNCLOS III was so complex that one observer cried out that "we
should never again convene a conference of the size and complexity of the
UNCLOS 111 ,138
In short, the comprehensive approach utilized at UNCLOS III was
inefficient. The negotiators at UNCED avoided the precedent of UNCLOS
III and established a more efficient approach which could be called a
"coordinated approach."
2. UNCED: Coordinated Approach
a. Avoiding the Precedent
At the beginning of the UNCED process, there was an irresistible trend
for a comprehensive approach advanced generally by developing countries
based on the "interrelationship argument." Based on the theory of interrela-
tionship between environment and development which was specifically
recognized by G.A. Resolution 44/228, 13 the developing countries tried to
link the issues of climate change and biodiversity with the broader context
of environment and development and to give the PrepCom overall control
135. For more thorough analysis, see Koh & Jayakumar, supra note 102, at 39-42.
136. Miles, supra note 125, at 40. See also Eustis, supra note 134, at 230.
137. See generally Koh & Jayakumar, supra note 102, at 87-99, 104-112.
138. Miles, supra note 125, at 40 (emphasis in the original).
139. G.A. Res. 44/228, supra note 13, at 4-6 and 11 of Resolution I (The importance of
this resolution is signified by continuous reference to it by developing countries). E.g.,
Statement by Algeria, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 45th Sess., 41st mtg., at 11, U.N. Doc.
A/C.2/45/SR.41 (1990). Additionally, the agenda of the PrepCom was named "Preparation for
the UNCED on the Basis of General Assembly Resolution 44/228 and Taking into Account
Other Relevant General Assembly Resolutions" by the demand of developing countries.
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over these issues. " The draft resolution submitted by G-77 identified the
objective of the Conference to "adopt formal agreements on specific
commitments,"14 implying that the final outcome would be legally binding
treaties with specific obligations. Thus, the developing countries saw
advantages in the comprehensive approach even in the UNCED process.
The developed countries and the academic circle 42 were generally
opposed to the comprehensive approach utilized in UNCLOS III process.
For example, the United States argued that the negotiations on a climate
convention should be conducted in a focused and efficient manner and
therefore should take place independent of the work by the PrepCom. 43
The draft resolution submitted by EC contained a provision affirming that
"the main objective of the Conference should be to agree on strategies and
measures," ' specifically avoiding the reference to legally binding instru-
ments.
Thus, the developed countries considered the PrepCom inappropriate for
negotiations on legally binding conventions on climate change and biodiver-
sity and tried to entrust the PrepCom with only the preparation of non-
binding instruments. They endeavored to separate the preparatory fora for
the two conventions from the PrepCom.
On this issue of modality of negotiation, the developed countries'
argument prevailed. In the final form of G.A. Resolution 44/228, any
mention of "formal agreements" was deleted. 45 The conventions on
climate change and biodiversity were to take the form of "framework" or
"umbrella," 'I signifying that only general principles and obligations would
140. U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 45th Sess., 41st mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/45/SR.41
(1990) (The Brazilian Representative stating that the negotiation on a climate convention should
be closely linked to the work of PrepCom). See also U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 45th Sess., 40th
mtg., at 16-17, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/45/SR.40 (1990) (The Chinese Representative stating that the
PrepCom should ensure negotiations on legal instruments be consistent with the theme and
principles of the Conference).
141. G-77 Draft of 1989, supra note 54 at 11 of Resolution U1.
142. EDITORS OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW 53-54 (American Bar Association, 1992) (commenting that it may be more effective
to reach several agreements on narrow issues than to attempt to negotiate one comprehensive
agreement). Elliot Richardson, Elements of a Framework Treaty on Climate Change, in
GREENHOUSE WARMING: NEGOTIATING A GLOBAL REGIME 25, 27 (World Resources Institute,
1991).
143. U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 44th Sess., 51st mtg., at 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/44/SR.51
(1989). See also U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 45th Sess., 49th mtg., at 3-5, U.N. Doc.
A/C.2/45/SR.40 (1990) (The New Zealand representative expressing the view that the prepara-
tion for Climate Convention and Biodiversity Convention should be separate from the
Conference preparation).
144. EC Draft of 1989, supra note 53, at 41 (1 3).
145. G.A. Res. 44/228, supra note 13 at 15(d) and (f) of Resolution I.
146. For the Climate Convention, see UNEP Governing Council Decision 15/36, Report of
the Governing Council, 15th Sess., supra note 31, at 166 ( 8); G.A. Res. 44/207, supra note
64 at 10; and G.A. Res. 45/212, supra note 26 at I 1 (stating the mandate of the INC on
Climate Change as to prepare an effective framework convention on climate change).
For the Biodiversity Convention, see UNEP Governing Council Decision 14/26, Report of
the Governing Council, 14th Sess., supra note 25, at 78 ( 1). Developed countries supported
25
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be set out in treaties, with an institutional mechanism to develop detailed
obligations in the future. 47 Most significantly, three separate fora were
established. Each of the convention-preparation fora, one for the Climate
Convention and another for the Biodiversity Convention, dealt only with one
subject and was deliberately separated from the PrepCom.
Thus, the developed countries succeeded in avoiding the precedent of the
inefficiency of the comprehensive approach utilized in UNCLOS III. The
UNCED process became a multi-fora international law-making process with
three separate fora each dealing with different subjects. The separation of
the international law-making forum would contribute to a more efficient
negotiation, but the UN tried to coordinate them institutionally' so as to
obtain maximum efficiency in the overall law-making process.
b. The Coordinated Approach
At its organizational session, the PrepCom decided to establish
appropriate guidelines for the provisions of progress reports on the negoti-
ations taking place under the auspices of UNEP. 49 At its first session, the
Secretary-General of UNCED was requested to closely follow the work on
both the climate change and the biodiversity negotiation processes."
Based on this information, the Secretary-General of UNCED was
requested to submit a report on the contribution of the PrepCom to the
negotiations held in other fora. This report became the cornerstone of the
coordinated approach of UNCED."5'
a framework convention. Proceedings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Work of Its First
Session, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div.I/Inf.2, at 88 (U.S.), 89 (Netherlands) and 90
(Norway) (1989).
147. David A. Wirth & Daniel A. Lashof, Beyond Vienna and Montreal : A Global
Framework Convention on Greenhouse Gases, 2 TRANSNAT'L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 81-
83 (1992). The idea of "framework" came from the precedent of the ozone protection
convention and protocols. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, adopted
Mar. 22, 1985, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1516, 1529 (1987). Montreal Protocol on Substances
That Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted Sept. 16, 1987, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1550
(1987), amended and adjusted, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 539 (1991).
148. The UN endeavor was an institutional coordination and was not a substantive
coordination. In other words, as will be discussed below, the three fora were designed to
coordinate in respect to the issues dealt with in each forum and with respect to the function of
each forum. There was no coordination with respect to the substantive provisions and specific
phrases. In fact, there are many inconsistencies among the final instruments created in the three
fora. See Marc Pallemaerts, International Environmental Law From Stockholm to Rio: Back to
the Future? 1 REv. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENv. L. 254, 257 (1992) (citing discrepancies
between the Climate Convention and the Biodiversity Convention).
149. UNCED PrepCom Report, Org. Sess., supra note 19, at 10.
150. The PrepCom Decision 1/11 on Climate Change, UNCED PrepCom Report, 1st Sess.,
supra note 20, at 26 ( (a)). See also id. The PrepCom Decision 1/16 on Conservation of
Biological Diversity, at 31 (1 (a)).
151. Report of the Secretary-General of the Conference:Preparation for the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development on the Basis of General Assembly Resolution
44/228 and Taking Into Account Other Relevant General Assembly Resolutions, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 151/PC/14, at 12-13 (1991).
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The report concluded that "the PrepCom's role can be seen as one of
providing broad and complementary support to these negotiating pro-
cess[es]."' 12 The PrepCom could support the INC on Climate Change and
the INC on Biodiversity in two respects. First, as a forum to create non-
legally binding instruments, the PrepCom could incorporate those issues
which States were not yet prepared to legally commit themselves.'53 This
kind of coordination can be characterized as the division of functions among
the international law-making fora, some of which deal with non-binding
instruments and others deal with legally binding instruments. The PrepCom,
in order to effectively fulfill this task, decided not to duplicate or pre-empt
the work of the convention processes.'-'
Second, the PrepCom, from a broader view on the environment and
development, could recommend the issues that should be dealt with by a
particular negotiating forum, or could combine the issues which were
common to two negotiating fora. This kind of coordination can be charac-
terized as the dividing or combining of issues among the international law-
making fora. For example, the INC on Climate Change at its third session
decided to refer the issue of forestry, which was common to both the Climate
Change and Biodiversity, to the PrepCom. 55 Also, the negotiations on the
financial interim mechanisms were coordinated by the PrepCom, the INC on
Climate Change and the INC on Biodiversity.'56
Therefore, the UNCED process was designed to be a coordinated multi-
fora process in which separate negotiating fora supposedly cooperate with
each other to produce universally acceptable instruments with maximum effi-
ciency. How far this coordination was achieved in actual practice is difficult
to evaluate, but at least the report by the Secretary-General of UNCED
demonstrated the need for such a coordination in multi-fora international law-
making processes.
152. Id. at 13.
153. Id. at 12 (The Secretary-General stated that "while many of the specific programmes
and actions needed will ultimately be mandated and carried out pursuant to the provisions of
legally binding conventions, the process of developing and implementing them on a voluntary
basis should proceed in parallel with the negotiating process." He continued that "many such
programmes and actions will be of such a nature that Governments will be prepared, and in
some cases may even prefer, to proceed with them on a voluntary basis before they become
mandatory under a legal agreement. ") (emphasis added).
154. The PrepCom Decision 2/8 on Climate Change, UNCED PrepCom Report, 2d Sess.,
supra note 20, at 31; The PrepCom Decision 2/9 on Biodiversity, id. at 32; The PrepCom
Decision on Protection of the Atmosphere, UNCED PrepCom Report, 3rd Sess., supra note 20,
at 65; The PrepCom Decision on Conservation of Biological Diversity: Options for Agenda 21,
id. at 72.
155. INC on Climate Report, 3d Sess., supra note 28, at 21.
156. GLOBAL AGENDA: ISSUES BEFORE THE 47TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 184 (John Tessitore & Susan woolfson eds., 1992).
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3. Achieving A Consensus
a. The Consensus Procedure At UNCLOS III
As UNCLOS III became a conference with universal participation, the
minority, mostly developed Western States, made every effort to avoid or
delay the taking of decisions by voting in which they would clearly be
outnumbered. The hard-fought negotiation on the rules of procedure'57
resulted in a consensus procedure with elaborate rules of decision-mak-
ing. 158 The Gentlemen's Agreement approved by the General Assembly
was annexed to the rules of procedure of the Conference. Its operative
paragraph stated as follows: "the Conference should make every effort to
157. See generally Miles, supra note 125, at 47-55.
158. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/30 and Rev. 1-3 (1974, 1975, and 1980).
Rule 37 (1) Before a matter of substance is put to the vote, a determination that all efforts at
reaching general agreements have been exhausted shall be made by the majority specified in
paragraph 1 of rule 39.
(2) Prior to making such a determination the following procedures may be invoked:
(a) When a matter of substance comes up for voting for the first time, the President may,
and shall if requested by at least 15 representatives, defer the question of taking a vote on such
matter for a period not exceeding 10 calendar days. The provision of this sub-paragraph may
be applied only once on the matter.
(b) At any time the Conference, upon a proposal by the President or upon motion by any
representative, may decide, by a majority of the representatives present and voting, to defer the
question of taking a vote on any matter of substance for a specified period of time.
(c) During any period of deferment, the President shall make every effort, with the
assistance as appropriate of the General Committee, to facilitate the achievement of general
agreement, having regard to the over-all progress made on all matters of substance which are
closely related, and a report shall be made to the Conference by the President prior to the end
of the period.
(d) If by the end of a specified period of deferment the Conference has not reached
agreement and if the question of taking a vote is not further deferred in accordance with
subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the determination that all efforts at reaching general
agreement have been exhausted shall be made in accordance with paragraph 1 of this rule.(e) If the Conference has not determined that all efforts at reaching agreement had been
exhausted, the President may propose or any representative may move, notwithstanding rule 36,
after the end of period of no less than five calendar days from the last prior vote on such a
determination, that such determination be made in accordance with paragraph 1 of this rule; the
requirement of five days' delay shall not apply during the last two weeks of a session.
(3) No vote shall be taken on any matter of substance less than two working days after an
announcement that the Conference is to proceed to vote on the matter has been made, during
which period the announcement shall be published in the Journal at the first opportunity.
Rule 39 (1) Decisions of the Conference on all matters of substance, including the adoption
of the text of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, as a whole, shall be taken by a two-thirds
majority of the representative present and voting, provided that such majority shall include at
least a majority of the States participating in the session of the Conference.
(2) Rule 37 shall not apply to the adoption of the text of the Convention as whole. However,
the Convention shall not be put to the vote less than four working days after the adoption of the
Conference.
(3) Except as otherwise specified in these rules, decisions of the Conference on all matters of
procedure shall be taken by a majority of the representatives present and voting.(4) If the question arises whether a matter is one of procedure or of substance, the President
shall rule on the question. An appeal against this ruling shall immediately be put to the vote and
the President's ruling shall stand unless the appeal is approved by a majority of the representa-
tives present and voting. Id.
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reach agreement on substantive matters by way of consensus and there should
be no voting on such matters until all efforts at consensus have been
exhausted." Undoubtedly, this unique decision-making procedure was one
of the main reasons for the very long duration of UNCLOS 111. 159
There were other negotiating techniques devised during UNCLOS III to
reach a consensus. One was the "package-deal" technique. The "package-
deal" was designed to recognize and formalize the trade-offs made by
negotiators among related and unrelated issues dealt with at UNCLOS III.
As discussed above, because of this technique, the negotiators resorted to
delaying tactics and the issues became so complexly interwoven that the
negotiation was no longer manageable. Even though some argue that the
consensus procedure and the "package-deal" were integrally linked at
UNCLOS III,160 the "package-deal" was more a result of the multi-issue
comprehensive approach rather than that of the consensus procedure.
The second technique was the attribution of great authority to key
individuals, namely the President of the Conference and the Chairmen of the
three main committees.' 61 These key individuals were given the authority
to prepare common negotiating texts in order to facilitate the negotiation. 62
The positive impact of this technique was, as expected, to foster real negotia-
tion which was lacking until this technique was devised. But there was also
serious backlash, causing the Conference to later decide to limit its applica-
tion. 163
Since the Chairmen could draft and revise texts within their individual
capacity, they were not required to consult key negotiators and they might
upset compromises reached in some other negotiating groups. This
happened when the First Committee's Chairman, Paul Engo, introduced a
revised text on the deep sea-bed mining regime in consultation with a handful
of his friends, mostly from developing countries. He ignored the fruitful
negotiation and the compromise already reached in the Evensen Group. The
revised text was so inclined to the demands of developing countries that the
United States and other developed countries declared it fundamentally
unacceptable. 65 The United States tried hard to redress the imbalance
159. Koh & Jayakumar, supra note 102, at 104.
160. Buzan, supra note 6, at 339. See also G. Plant, The Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea and the Preparatory Commission: Model for United Nations Law-Making?
36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 525, 528-31 (1987).
161. Koers, supra note 2, at 28-30.
162. Plant, supra note 160, at 535. See also Buzan, supra note 6, at 333-334 (discussing
the background of choosing this technique at UNCLOS III).
163. In 1978, the authority of the individual presiding officers was curtailed by forming and
entrusting the function of revisions to the "collegiality" composed of the President, the three
Committee Chairmen, the Rapporteur-General and the Chairman of the Drafting Committee.
Plant, supra note 160, at 537.
164. Id. at 535.
165. The account of this incident and the angry reaction of the United States were
interestingly depicted in MARKUS G. SCHMIDT, COMMON HERITAGE OR COMMON BURDEN? 132-
138 (1989).
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reflected in the text but could never achieve it. This was an important reason
for its refusal to accept the Law of the Sea Convention.
With these experiences still vividly remembered, the negotiators at
UNCED tried to improve some of the aspects of the consensus procedure
utilized at UNCLOS III in order to achieve more efficient law-making
process in UNCED.
b. The "Revised" Consensus Procedure at UNCED
In the UNCED process, the rules of procedure and the election of
officers were also controversial issues. The general trend that can be
recognized from the three processes was to keep the consensus procedure
but, at the same time, to somewhat facilitate the decision-taking by vote. For
example, the rules of procedure of the Conference drafted by the PrepCom
recognized the need to achieve a consensus but avoided elaborate provisions
regarding the decision-making by simply referring to the General Assembly
rules of procedure."6 The General Assembly requires two-thirds majority
only on decisions on "important questions." The same trend could be seen
in the INC on Climate Change67 and in the INC on Biodiversity.'68
These provisions provide modest pressure on the negotiators, thus facilitating
the effort to reach a consensus.
The need for more efficient decision-making at UNCED was the result
of time limitations set on each of the three processes. This is another
improvement from UNCLOS III where there was no such limitation.
UNCED was specifically limited to a two week duration by G.A. Resolution
44/228.69 Each session of the INC on Climate Change was also limited
to a two week duration, 70 and the Convention had to be ready by the
166. Provisional Rules of Procedure, Article 33 (best endeavors to accomplish general
agreement) and Article 35 (decision-making in accordance with the GA rules of procedure), Note
by the Secretary-General of the Conference: Adoption of the Rules of Procedure, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 151/2, at 10 (1992). The secretariat's draft required two thirds vote for every
substantive decision. Report of the Secretary-General of the Conference:Draft provisional
agenda, organization of work and draft rules of procedure of the Conference, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.151/PC/56, at 13-14 (1991).
167. The draft submitted by the secretariat required two thirds vote for all substantive
matters. Note by the Secretariat: Organizational Matters: Rules of Procedure, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.237/2, at 8 (1991). But it was again changed as to conform with the GA rules. Rules
of Procedure, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/5, at 7-8 (1991).
168. Legal WG on Biodiversity Report, 2d Sess., supra note 32, Annex, at 26. (Rule 32:
The meeting should make every effort to reach consensus on substantive matters; Rule 34(1):
Subject to Rule 32, decisions of the meeting on substantive matters shall be taken by a two-thirds
majority of the Parties present and voting).
169. G.A. Res. 44/228, supra note 13 at 1 of Resolution I.
170. G.A. Res. 45/212, supra note 26 at 6.
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Conference. The Biodiversity process had the same restraints.1 71 The time
limitation, if fair and adequate, could also facilitate negotiation toward
consensus by providing appropriate pressure on the negotiators.
Another improvement at UNCED, which would reinforce the effort to
achieve consensus with maximum efficiency, was the attribution of authority
to representative bodies rather than to individuals. In the long run, a discreet
deliberation by key representatives would contribute more to an efficient law-
making process than a hasty decision by an individual would. For example,
the INC on Climate Change utilized the system of co-chairmenship for its
two working groups." Even though this was a political decision to
resolve a deadlock, this system worked very well as at least one each from
developed and developing countries could participate in the formulation of
important documents. 7  This kind of technique could contribute to increas-
ing confidence of negotiators in working groups and in the negotiating forum
itself.
Thus, in the UNCED process, the protection of the minority in the
universally participated law-making process was ensured by the consensus
procedure, and at the same time, the efficiency of the process was achieved
by the multi-fora approach and other measures to facilitate the negotiation.
All these efforts at UNCED should be looked at as making the international
law-making process in the UN more efficient and its content more reflective
of the real interests of the international community, without sacrificing the
universality and representativeness which are indispensable factors for the
creation of universally applicable legal regimes for international cooperation.
C. The Follow-Up Mechanisms: Continuation of the Process
Before concluding, a few words should be said about the follow-up
mechanisms in order to understand the overall trends of the international law-
making process in the United Nations.
The International law-making process of UNCLOS III did not end at the
final session of the Conference in December 1982. The Conference
established the Preparatory Commission For the International Sea-Bed
Authority and For the International Tribunal For the Law of the Sea (Sea-
171. Clare Shine & Palitha T.B. Kohona, The Convention on Biological Diversity: Bridging
the Gap Between Conservation and Development, 1 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY L. & INT'L ENV.
L. 278, 282 (1992) (stating that the PrepCom set the deadline of June 1992 and that this served
to put constructive pressure on negotiators).
172. INC on Climate Report, 2d Sess., supra note 28, at 6-7 (Japan and Mexico as Co-
Chairmen of Working Group I, and Canada and Vanuatu as Co-Chairmen of Working Group
11).
173. For example, the Co-Chairmen of WG I were given the authority to prepare "a new
compilation of elements." INC on Climate Report, 2d Sess., supra note 28, at 10-12.
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Bed PrepCom)7 4 with the mandate to draft rules and procedures for the
Authority and to exercise the powers and functions assigned by the resolution
concerning pioneer activities in the Area. 75 The Sea-Bed PrepCom, with
the participation of all the signatories of the Convention, has been working
to establish an universally acceptable legal regime, which the Conference
could not quite achieve, by formulating specific provisions which take into
account new concepts and economic and technological developments.
7 6
The international law-making process of UNCED is also continuing.
The Economic and Social Council of the UN, at the request of the General
Assembly,'" established the Commission on Sustainable Development in
1993 with the mandate to effectively follow-up the Conference and to
examine the progress of the implementation of Agenda 21.178 Through the
work of this Commission, some of the principles enunciated in the Rio
Declaration and the Forests Statement could be clarified and some of the
provision of Agenda 21 might be incorporated in legally binding instruments
in the future.
The INC on Climate Change adopted a resolution concerning interim
arrangements at its fifth session. 179 It provided that the INC would again
be convened by the Secretary-General to prepare for the first session of the
Conference of the Parties of the Climate Convention and, accordingly, the
sixth session of the INC on Climate Change was held in December 1992'"
and the seventh session was held in March 1993. It is very possible that the
INC might be able to agree on protocols even before the Convention enters
into force.
It is, therefore, another feature of the recent international law-making
174. Resolution I: Establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-
Bed Authority and For the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, reprinted in 1 COMME-
NTARY, supra note 3, at 423.
175. Resolution 11: Governing Preparatory Investment in Pioneer Activities Relating To
Polymetallic Nodules, reprinted in 1 COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 425.
176. See generally Progress Report of the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the
International Seabed Authority and For the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on the
Work of the Commission, U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/L. 103, at 11-50 (1992) (This is a summary of
10 years of work of the Sea-Bed PrepCom). Regarding the pioneer activities the Sea-Bed
PrepCom reached an understanding which takes into account the economic reality of the issue.
For example, the self-selection of the area to be reserved for the Authority was adopted even
though Resolution II requires the PrepCom to designate those areas. More significantly, the
annual fee which the registered investors must pay under the resolution was waived on the
condition that they satisfy obligations concerning training and exploration. Id. at 6-7.
177. See generally G.A. Res. 47/191, supra note 99.
178. The Commission is composed of 53 Member States and elected Razali Ismali of
Malaysia as its Chairman. Report of the Commission on Sustainable Development on Its
Organizational Session, U.N. Doc. E/1993/25, E/CN. 17/1993/3, at 9 (1993).
179. Resolution Adopted by the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change (INC/1992/1), U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part 1)/Add.1, at 28
(1992).
180. See Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change on the Work of Its Sixth Session Held at Geneva From 7 to 10
December, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/24 (1993).
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processes in the UN that the instruments so created establish the fora to
continue the process of international law-making with more defined directions
and within the framework of the mother instruments. The international law-
making process in the UN is an incessant process towards creating a better
and more acceptable international cooperative legal regime.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The present article analyzed, through the comparative analysis of
UNCED and UNCLOS III, the major features and trends of the process of
international law-making in the United Nations in order to extrapolate the
organizational and procedural factors which the States consider as contrib-
uting to the legitimacy of the process. The legitimate process yields
legitimate outcome, and that in turn contributes to the wider, hopefully
universal, acceptance of international legal instruments which the present
international community desperately needs.
It was the demand of the developing countries, who have been left out
of the law-making process until recently, which established the principle of
effective participation in the international law-making process in order to
make the law-making forum representative of the international community,
both quantitatively and qualitatively. The representative forum in which
every State is treated politically equal with respect to the making of
international law is the foundation of the democratization of the international
law-making process. The United Nations, and especially the conferences
convened under its auspices, becomes the primary choice for such a forum.
Combined with the general acceptance of this principle by developed
countries, the democratization of the international law-making process
contributes to the wider acceptance of legal instruments created in such a
process.
It was the demand of the minority developed countries, who were
outnumbered in the democratized international law-making process, which
promoted the development of a more efficient and interest-reflecting modality
of negotiation in the international law-making process. The separate-but-
coordinated approach with the "revised" consensus procedure was devised
to make the international law-making process more efficient and, at the same
time, to adequately protect the minority. These techniques facilitate the
negotiation and the achievement of consensus in an universally participated
law-making forum. This, combined with the general acceptance by develop-
ing countries, contributes to the wider acceptance of legal instruments created
in such a forum.
The achievement of the delicate balance between democratization and
efficiency in the international law-making process depends on the diplomatic
skill and the cooperative spirit of the negotiators in the conferences.
Even though the international law-making process has become a political
endeavor from its inception with State representatives playing the primary
negotiating role, the importance of participation of international lawyers and
33
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NGOs has also increased in recent international law-making processes. The
participation of NGOs may especially be considered an important factor to
be taken into account for the concept of the democratization of the interna-
tional law-making process.
The international law-making process in the United Nations is an
incessant process, the dynamics of which has significant impact on the
international community. The changes in the international community
influence the principles and modality of the international law-making process,
and the changes in the international law-making process in turn become the
impetus for further changes in the international community. 8' A better
understanding of the international law-making process sharpens our
observation of the international community.
181. See generally CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING (Antonio
Cassess & Joseph H.H. Weiler eds., 1989).
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Table (1)
THE UNCED PROCESS
UNCED
1987
April Our Common Future
[Declaration and
convention by GA]
June
Dec. GA Res.42/186 [Env.
Persp.]
GA Res.42/187
(Report of the World
Comm.]
1988
June
Nov.
Dec. GA Res.43/196
[decide to discuss
UNced next session]
1989
Feb.
Climate Change Biodiversity
Our Common Future Our Common Future
[Convention] [Covention]
UNEP GC Dec.14/20
[need of intergov'tal
mechanism]
GA Res.42/184
[prob. of climate
change!
IPCC 1st Sess.
[est. 3 working
groups]
GA Res.43/53 [cony.
on climate change
mentioned]
UNEP GC Dec.14/26
[Expert WG for
umbrella convention]
GA Res.42/184
[takes note of GC
Dec.]
UNEP Exp.WG on
Biodiversity, 1st Sess.
Mar.
May UNEP GC Dec.15/3
[UN conf. on env. &
dev.1
UNEP GC Dec.15/36 UNEP GC Dec.15/34
[preparation for lest.of Legal WG]
cony.]
IPCC 2nd Sess.
Nov.
Dec. GA Res. 44/228 GA Res.44/207 [GA GA Res.44/229
[UNCED, PrepCom] as appropriate forum] [welcome GC dec.]
1990
Feb.
Mar.
May
World Conf. on the
Changing Atmosph.,
Toronto
Mtg of Legal &
Policy Experts,
Ottawa.
Conf. of Developing
countries on climate
change.
Hague Conf. on
Atmosphere.
EC Council Res.
Paris Summit.
Non-Aligned Count.
Conf.
Tokyo Conf. on
Global Env.
Ministerial Conf.,
Noordwijk.
Cairo Compact.
IPCC 3rd Sess. UNEP Exp.WG on
Biodiversity 2nd Sess.
UNCED PrepCom
Org Sess.
Bergan Ministerial
Declaration.
IPCC WG3 Response
Strategy Report.
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(UNCED)
1990
July
Aug. UNEP GC
Dec.SS.11/9 [priority
of issues at UNCED]
UNCED PrepCom 1st
Sess. [more research]
Sept.
Nov.
Dec. GA Res.45/211
[endorse PrepCom]
1991
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
UNCED PrepCom
2nd Sess. [relation
with INC]
UNCED PrepCom
3rd Sess.
(Climate Change) (Biodiversity)
UNEP GC
Dec.SS.II/3
[WG for convention
preparation[
UNCED PrepCom
Dec I/I I 1control
over UNEP work]
IPCC 1st Assess.
Report
UNEP Ad Hoc WG
of Gov. Repr.
[recommen.]
GA Res.45/212
[INC established]
INC on Climate Ist
sess. [2 Working G]
IPCC 5th pl.sess.
UNEP GC Dec.
16/41.
INC on Climate 2nd
sess. [single text]
INC on Climate 3rd
Sess.
Dec. GA Res.46/168 GA Res.46/169
[UNCED] [protect.of climate]
INC on Climate 4th
Sess. [consolidated
working doc.]
1992
Feb. UNEP 3rd Special
Sess.
INC on Climate 5th
Sess, 1st pt. [Revised
Text under Neg.]
UNEP Exp.WG on
Biodiversity 3rd Sess.
[elements of conv.]
UNEP GC
Dec.SS.I1/5 [progress
report]
UNCED PrepCom
Dec 1/16
UNEP SWG on
Biotech.
UNEP Legal WG on
Biodiversity 1st sess.
[elements of draft]
UNEP Mtg of legal
advisors.
UNEP Legal WG on
Biodiversity 2nd Sess.
[draft convention]
UNEP GC Dec.16/42
[rename to INC on
Biodiversity]
INC on Biodiversity
3rd/Ist sess. [revised
draft cony.]
(Other)
Houston Summit
2nd World Climate
Conf.
Beijing Ministerial
Declaration.
INC on Biodiversity
4th/2nd sess. [2nd
revised draft cony.]
INC on Biodiversity
5th/3rd Sess. [3rd
revised draft cony.]
INC on Biodiversity
6th/4th Sess. [4th
revised draft cony.]
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(UNCED)
UNCED PrepCom
4th Sess.
(Climate Change) (Biodiversity) (Other)
May INC on Climate 5th INC on Biodiversity Tokyo Decl.
Sess. 2nd pt. 7th/Sth Sess. Kuala Lumpur Decl.
[adoption of Adoption Conference.
Convention] [adoption of
convention]
June THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT
[Adopted Agenda 21, [Convention opened [Convention opened
Rio Decl., Forest for signature] for signature
Statement]
Dec. Commission for INC on Climate 6th
Sustainable Sess.
Development GA
Res.47/191
1992
Mar
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